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A Plea for Reform
The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial. By Marvin E. Frankel
and Gary P. Naftalis. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977. Pp. 148. $8.95.
Reviewed by Norval Morrist
The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial by Marvin E. Frankel
and Gary P. Naftalis is effective and timely in that it rides the crest
of a wave of grand jury reform. It is certain to be influential in
reshaping state and federal pretrial procedures. Like Judge Frankel's
Criminal Sentences: Law without Order1 it is a concise, vigorous,
gracefully phrased monograph. Unlike that earlier book, it does not
reflect an impassioned reformist perspective. Paradoxically, prosecu-
torial discretion, exercised over and through the grand jury, may prove
more resistant to control than judicial sentencing discretion, because
prosecutors may have a greater investment in the inefficiencies and
injustices of American criminal procedure than judges.
In their Introduction, Frankel and Naftalis promise to examine the
history and functions of the grand jury, the problems and practices
that have made it a subject of controversy, and major proposals for
reform now pending in Congress.2 They further engage to present
their own views on "some debatable questions." 3 The authors keep
these promises with style and precision, but in brief compass. One
crucial issue and two lesser issues are finessed. The critical question
whether the grand jury should be abolished rather than reformed is set
aside with too great haste;4 the proper scope of immunity (use or
transactional)5 and the scope of judicial power over leaks from and
t Dean, University of Chicago Law School.
1. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1978).
2. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALIs, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 5 (1977)
[hereinafter cited by page number only].
3. Id.
4. Pp. 117-21.
5. Pp. 76-81, 127-28.
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publicity about grand jury proceedings are also treated in summary
fashion." The latter two issues are arguably collateral to grand jury re-
form, and enough has been written about them for Frankel and Naf-
talis's incorporation of them by reference and summation to suffice.
In the abolition or reform debate, Frankel and Naftalis side with
the reformers and against both the abolitionists and those (mostly
United States Attorneys) who see the grand jury as a necessary weap-
on against crime that does not require substantial reform. The au-
thors propose a comprehensive list of reforms. Among them are more
effective judicial instructions to the grand jury, stricter accountability
of prosecutors to the courts, a full transcript of proceedings before
the grand jury, right to counsel for grand jury witnesses, adequate
notice prior to compelled appearance before a grand jury, reduction
of the powers of the grand jury over recalcitrant witnesses, advice to
the witness that he is a prospective defendant if and when he is, pres-
entation by a witness of exculpatory evidence or testimony, limitation
on repeated efforts to indict before successive grand juries, and better
protections against injurious leaks of grand jury testimony.7
The length and scope of the list of proposed changes makes one
fear that in the effort to bring a larger measure of fairness to the
grand jury we may further protract appalling delays in the prose-
cution of ordinary felony cases and move yet further towards a nego-
tiative rather than an adversarial system. I am no perfervid champion
of the adversary system; there is, in my view, much to be said for
the inquisitorial pretrial procedures of the Western European democ-
racies. But it would be sad indeed if we wound up with the worst of
both worlds.
The tension between those who would reform and those who would
preserve without change the grand jury was illustrated recently by a
debate over the issue of a grand jury witness's right to counsel. At its
last meeting, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association,
not a radical body, voted 186 to 93 to recommend that grand jury
witnesses be afforded that right.8 Spokesmen for the Department of
Justice vigorously opposed the reform as a serious obstacle to prose-
cution of drug-related, white-collar, and organized crimeY
But in spite of widespread opposition from prosecutors, abolition
or substantial reform of the grand jury seems imminent. In the words
of Frankel and Naftalis:
6. Pp. 85-89, 132-35, 137.
7. Pp. 121-37.
8. Chicago Sun Times, August 10, 1977, at 41, col. 5.
9. Id.
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There are widespread charges, and not a little proof, of abuses.
The grand jury has served too often ... to harass the unorthodox
and the unpopular. Its large and secret powers have proved too
frequently to be terrifying weapons in the hands of righteous
or cynical prosecutors. There have been too many cases in which
witnesses have been badgered, trapped, subjected to harsh, sud-
den, and wearing appearances in distant places, defamed by leaks
not necessarily accidental, or otherwise scarred by gratuitously
high-handed or perverse employment of the grand jury's great
authority.1 0
Frankel and Naftalis argue that abolition of the grand jury is neither
feasible nor desirable. It is true that given the entrenchment of the
grand jury in the Bill of Rights there is little likelihood of abolition
in federal practice. But in the states the grand jury is already fre-
quently by-passed in routine felony cases. In the Circuit Court of Cook
County, for example, the grand jury is something that is hurried
through upstairs subsequent to negotiation and decision respecting
what charge will be prosecuted. States' attorneys compete with each
other in testing how few questions and answers replete with hearsay
will trigger a true bill. In most crowded city courts the grand jury
is merely one possible step in the leisurely round of negotiations and
pretrial motions en route to a plea. It is certainly no shield of liberty
as it was in the minds of the framers of the Fifth Amendment, no
protection against abuse of state power. In most states the prosecutor
can, in fact, avoid the grand jury entirely if he is so minded and
proceed instead by information or similar processes.
The reform or abolition question thus differs between federal prac-
tice and state and local practice since, as Frankel and Naftalis rightly
argue, amending the Bill of Rights is no light or inconsequential
task.11 But in rejecting abolition of the grand jury as an alternative
to reform, they turn their case more than elsewhere and more than
is justifiable on federal practice where the constitutional barrier to
abolition is so formidable.
Frankel and Naftalis also offer two policy justifications for reform-
ing rather than abolishing the grand jury. First, they suggest that
"[t]he grand jury as a roving ombudsman has a fairly long and fre-
quently honorable record."'1 It is certainly true that in regard to its
investigation of political crime, its uncovering of bribery and cor-
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collar crime, prosecutorial affection for the grand jury is understand-
able and commendable. But the very efficiency of the grand jury as
investigator and the great power that it gives the determined prose-
cutor have not infrequently led to its abuse by overzealous prosecu-
tors as a weapon against the unorthodox and unpopular. Judge Huf-
stedtler has perceived the sad paradox: "It would be a cruel twist of
history to allow the institution of the grand jury that was designed
at least partially to protect political dissent to become an instrument
of political suppression."1 3 Reform of the grand jury in federal prac-
tice thus faces the formidable challenge of improving the grand jury's
investigative function, in terms of fairness and efficiency, without
imposing further delays on already dilatory pretrial processes. In the
states the task is easier since there is little to be said for retaining
the "probable cause" role of the grand jury.
Many countries have shaped preliminary inquiry procedures that,
without using the grand jury, strike a decent balance between the
needs for conviction of the guilty and for avoidance of trials of those
of whom probable cause of guilt is lacking.' 4 A preliminary hearing
before a judicial officer, in which the prosecution must make a prima
facie case and in which the defense, represented by counsel, may at
its election offer evidence, is a simple procedure to find probable
cause that does not raise difficulty elsewhere in the common law
world nor in those jurisdictions where it has been adopted in the
United States. It does not, of course, function as an investigative pro-
cedure, but the framers of the Bill of Rights did not have that func-
tion in mind when they built the grand jury into the Fifth Amend-
ment. The availability of such alternatives for finding probable cause
places a crucial burden on those who would reform rather than abolish
the grand jury to improve the investigative role of the grand jury with-
out adding further delays and inefficiencies to the prosecution of
ordinary crime.
Second, Frankel and Naftalis commend the grand jury as "a vehicle
for citizen participation in government."'15 This appears, in fact, to
be their bottom-line argument against abolition, since they recognize
that investigation could be accomplished without the grand jury. They
suggest that the interposition of lay jurors at the pretrial stage con-
tributes to the protection of individuals, the flexibility and respon-
13. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1089 (9th Cir. 1972).
14. For a recent far-reaching proposal for the creation of an investigative magistracy
that would render the grand jury's investigative function otiose, see L. WEINRER, DENIAL
OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1977).
15. P. 120.
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siveness of the law, and the legitimacy of the criminal process. The
argument is appealing, but it has all too frequently been used to avoid
the issue of whether lay participation in fact accomplishes those ends.
That is the larger issue behind the debate over abolition of the
grand jury that Frankel and Naftalis never quite address.
Lurking behind any discussion of grand jury reform is the prob-
lem of that "over-mighty subject" of the criminal law, the prosecutor.
Powerfully armed to compel testimony by subpoena and grant of im-
munity, unfettered in the selection of what crimes to pursue, the
prosecutor is a towering inquisitorial figure in the otherwise largely
adversarial landscape of criminal justice. One wonders, at the end
of Frankel and Naftalis's excellent study, whether reforms of grand
jury practices will much affect the potential for and the occasional
reality of abuse of the prosecutor's formidable powers. As Frankel
and Naftalis put it:
The general problem of selecting, and better regulating, prosecu-
tors plainly transcends, though it directly affects, the subject of
the present book. But such matters are separable only in the
sense that finite amounts of reading and writing are about all
we can manage in any allotted time period. The interconnections
are worth mentioning, if only not to lose sight of them.'"
This balance of insight and modesty characterizes the entire work. The
Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial merits the attention of all con-
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The Structure of the Corporation: By Melvin Aron Eisenberg. Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1976. Pp. xvi, 320. $16.50.
Reviewed by Donald E. Schwartzt
This is the corporation's season in the sun. Next to government,
the large corporation is probably the dominant economic and social
institution in our society. The extensive examination to which it
is now being subjected is welcome and overdue.' To this examina-
tion, Professor Melvin Eisenberg has made a readable, important,
and provocative contribution. Although The Structure of the Cor-
poration neither raises all the questions nor furnishes all the answers,
it moves us significantly toward a prescription of sound policy for
corporate law.
Fear of the "soulless" corporation is not new. The metaphor re-
curs constantly in nineteenth century debates on corporations. 2 Yet cor-
porate reform has largely concerned the corporation's external relation-
ships, especially the protection of customers, creditors, and investors.
To ignore relationships within the corporation is paradoxical since
the corporation's acts result from the decisions of individuals proceed-
ing in accordance with norms prescribed by law. This corporate "con-
stitutional law," as Professor Eisenberg terms it,3 can surely also chan-
nel the economic and social influence of "soulless" corporations.
Professor Eisenberg's earlier publications have played important
roles in causing other scholars and critics to look more closely within
the corporation. 4 The Structure of the Corporation, a synthesis of
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. E.g., Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 13482 (Apr. 28, 1977), FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) i" 81,130; Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 13901 (Aug. 29, 1977), FEn. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) f 81,296; Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); The Role of the Shareholder in the
Corporate World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights
and Remedies of the Senate Judicialy Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 171-72 (1973).
3. Mi. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
4. See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation:
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. Rav. 375 (1975); Eisenberg, Mega-
subsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control, 84 HARV. L. REv.
1577 (1971); Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1489
(1970); Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Cor-
porate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969).
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these articles, seeks to analyze and develop "new and more highly
articulated models of corporate structure."5
Eisenberg's most important chapters treat the role of management
in corporate structure. Corporate critics have devoted much attention
to defining the role of the board and prescribing cures for its defi-
ciencies. Eisenberg contrasts the received legal model, under which
the board makes policy and manages the business, with the working
model, under which the executives exercise those functions. He is
disturbed by the discrepancy between myth and reality:
[M]any legal rules have been shaped on the premise that the
board manages the corporation's business in fact as well as in
law. For example, by proceeding from the assumption that of-
ficers play a subordinate role to the board, the rules governing
the authority of officers frequently embody an unrealistically
restrictive view of an officer's power of position. Standards of
care, by the same token, often seem to be pitched to the outside
director rather than the executive, as if the former were really
running the business .... In a wider context, the skew between
belief and reality has led to what might be called the quack-cure
problem-the danger that belief in the validity of the received
legal model will forestall meaningful regulation by lulling share-
holders, legislators, and the public into the illusion (which often
seems deliberately conjured-up) that a disinterested board is su-
pervising the corporation's affairs. 6
Professor Eisenberg suggests his own model. He finds the principal
function of the board to be monitoring management, not giving ad-
vice, approving major transactions, or exercising control. The prime
requirements of his model are independent directors and an adequate
flow of information to the board. His definition of independent di-
rectors excludes the corporation's counsel, investment bankers, im-
portant suppliers and customers, and management's relatives. 7 Con-
trol of the corporate proxy machinery is vested exclusively in the
independent directors.8 Adequate flow of information depends heavily
on the selection and role of independent accountants. Eisenberg ar-
gues that too much discretion is allowed to management in selecting
accountants and accounting conventions.0 The choice of "generally
5. P. 6.
6. P. 148 (footnotes omitted).
7. Pp. 175-76.
8. P. 176. I assume that this means "exclusively" with respect to the board's own
access to the proxy statement and is subject to the shareholders' right to have access,
an idea that Eisenberg favors.
9. The SEC has limited management's discretion in this area somewhat by requiring
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accepted accounting principles" that "present fairly" the financial
condition of a company can "subvert legitimate expectations."' 0 He
would reassign these functions, giving independent accountants the
choice of accounting principles and independent directors the choice
of accountants. Eisenberg's criticisms and proposals are of central im-
portance to an understanding of corporate governance.
Eisenberg defines the role of stockholders in a publicly owned cor-
poration largely by examining their voting rights." He states that
three schools of thought exist: "shareholder democracy," which would
strengthen the power of the shareholders; constituency representation,
which would give a direct voice to various groups with a stake in cor-
porate activity (for example, employees, customers, suppliers); and
managerialism, which would increase the power of management to
enable it to further the ends of enlightened social policy.
Eisenberg finds serious flaws in the last two models. Constituency
representation is unworkable, and managerialism is dangerous because
management's interests may conflict with those of the stockholders.
Eisenberg's preference is to put "structural matters directly into the
shareholders' province."'12 Whether a matter is structural depends not
on whether it is "major," "fundamental," or "extraordinary," but
rather on whether it deals with the structure of the enterprise or
relates to its control. 13 All business decisions are left exclusively to
management.'
4
disclosure of a change of accountants that is occasioned by a disagreement on a matter
of accounting principles or practices or financial statement disclosure. Accounting Series
Release No. 165, 40 F.R. 1010, FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) F1 72,187 (Dec. 20, 1974).
10. P. 194. Professor Eisenberg does not discuss the effect of the SEC requirement that
whenever a company makes a change to an alternative accounting principle, the certi-
fying accountants shall file a letter indicating whether or not the change is to an
alternative principle that the accountant believes is preferable. Accounting Series Release
No. 177, 40 F.R. 46107, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) f 72,199 (Sept. 10, 1975). The require-
ment doubtless allows less leeway to management in the selection of accounting principles,
although it does not eliminate the need for the type of reform Professor Eisenberg
proposes.
11. Unlike most statute writers, Professor Eisenberg deals separately with the closed
corporation, which he approaches by comparison with partnership agreements.
12. P. 36. It is not clear whether putting structural matters "directly into the share-
holders' province" denies any role to the board of directors, or whether it gives share-
holders only the final word. The former would be a major departure from state law
and would greatly strengthen the shareholders' power. I doubt, however, whether Pro-
fessor Eisenberg means that. Most structural decisions-for example, whether to merge
with another company, whether to make a partial liquidation of the company's assets,
whether to amend the certificate of incorporation to authorize additional shares-have
to originate with management. It seems unlikely that Professor Eisenberg would want
to submit such proposals directly to the shareholders without first obtaining a recom-
mendation from the board of directors.
13. Pp. 15-16.
14. P. 68.
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Some commentators have disagreed with Eisenberg's view on prac-
tical, not theoretical, grounds. These critics regard shareholders as
powerless and indifferent.' 5 Eisenberg questions this view-"the ATS:T
myth"1'8-by noting that it mistakes the characteristics of a few mam-
moth corporations for those of the paradigm. Moreover, Eisenberg be-
lieves that, even in the largest companies, there are many institutional
investors neither indifferent nor uninformed about structural mat-
ters, and in whose hands the vote is significant.' 7
Nevertheless, critics of shareholder participation contend further
that the market offers a superior alternative to shareholder democracy.
This approach is commonly referred to as the "Wall Street rule":
unhappy stockholders express displeasure by selling their shares rather
than by participating in corporate governance. The advocates of this
"rule" argue that it is simple to apply, costs less than the mechanism
required to implement the corporate political process necessitated
by stockholder activism, and is effective. Its rationale is that if enough
stockholders sell shares, the price of the corporation's stock would
decline, making management vulnerable to outsiders seeking control
of the company.
Although Professor Eisenberg recognizes the value of actual or po-
tential control takeovers,' 8 he does not comment on the relationship
of the Wall Street rule to the creation of a formal structure for stock-
holder participation. His sentiments are clearly against exclusive re-
liance on the market, however, and in this judgment I agree.
The Wall Street rule is not the delicate instrument for change that
its supporters seem to believe. Advocates of the Wall Street rule often
confuse it with other market devices that are used to punish ineffi-
ciency by departure or withholding patronage. Stockholders do not
withhold patronage or depart the corporation when they sell their
stock; only the identity of the stockholders changes. The message
communicated by a sale of stock, matched by a purchase of stock, is
ambiguous, as a series of random, uncoordinated decisions is bound
to be.
In addition, it is questionable whether the rule does anything for
the corporation. Large sales of the corporation's stock lower its price.
A decline in the price of stock could injure the corporation and its
15. Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and
Particular Reservations, 55 Nw. L. REv. 38 (1960); Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J.
1477 (1958).
16. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Cor-
porate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 33 (1969).
17. P. 54.
18. See pp. 58-59.
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shareholders by reducing the value of stock options and outstanding
warrants and by raising the cost of capital in general. Finally, no data
have been collected that establish a close relationship between the
impact of the market and the stockholders' ability to effect a struc-
tural impact on control.
Eisenberg's belief in stockholder participation appears to be sound 19
As he recognizes, however, the difficulties in marshaling a fragmented
army of small stockholders make significant stock ownership by large
institutions a prerequisite to effective stockholder participation. In-
stitutional owners have easy access to corporate management. This
power stems not only from the ownership of many shares in the com-
pany, but also from the similar backgrounds and common viewpoints
of corporate and institutional managers..2 0 Fortunately, data show that
even huge corporations have large concentrations of holdings in a few
hands.2 ' Thus the suggestion for recognizing significant stockholder
participation rights is not quixotic.
Professor Eisenberg might have gone farther in his analysis of share-
holder participation. Beyond the mere availability of institutions to
play an important role, it is desirable corporate policy that they should
do so.22 Institutions formerly voted their shares as management recom-
mended with great regularity.23 With the increased occurrence of
stockholder resolutions that raised issues of public policy, institutions
ceased to cast an automatic vote for management.2 4 Equally impor-
tant, they frequently expressed their views to management on a variety
of issues.2 The result has often been a therapeutic airing of important
social questions, such as corporate presence in South Africa, control
of pollution, and increased opportunities for minorities. Such insti-
tutional activity is of benefit to all shareholders.
Vital to greater shareholder participation is the proxy machinery,
19. See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970) (suggesting that corporation's
ability to recover from deterioration in quality depends on availability to shareholder of
opportunity either to sell stock or to express dissatisfaction to management).
20. See Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM,
69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 494-511 (1971).
21. Pp. 47-49.
22. See A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 360 (1976).
23. 5 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMIM'N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT 2760-63, 2846
(1971).
24. See generally B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR: A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION (1973); J. SIMON,
C. POWERS & J. GUNNEMAN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR (1972); N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1972, at
71, col. 6.
25. See the Investor Responsibility Research Center's Survey entitled the 1977 Proxy
Season: How the Institutions Voted on Shareholder Resolutions and Management Pro-
posals 6 (1977).
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which now enables management to perpetuate its incumbency. Pro-
fessor Eisenberg finds basic principles to support the simple proposi-
tion that shareholders should have the same opportunity as manage-
ment to gain access to the company's proxy statement for the purpose
of nominating directors. State law gives the stockholders the exclusive
right to elect directors, and a necessary corollary to that right is the
right to make a timely nomination.
The difficulty, as Professor Eisenberg fully appreciates, is in de-
vising an alternative that provides access without destroying the proxy
machinery. In its recent hearings on corporate governance, the SEC
questioned whether it has power to address the problem of access,
whether a solution could be made practical, and, indeed, whether
there should be such access.2 6 I believe the answer to all three ques-
tions is affirmative.
The Commission's power stems from its mandate to achieve "fair
corporate suffrage. '27 The Commission could reasonably conclude that
a one-sided presentation of candidates for directorships is an unfair
solicitation. It could condition the use of interstate facilities and the
mails for the purpose of soliciting proxies upon furnishing nonman-
agement shareholders an opportunity to nominate candidates through
the corporate proxy machinery.
2s
The key is to make access reasonable. Nominations are easy to make,
and the process could be subject to frivolous use much more readily
than the stockholder proposal process. Consequently, restrictions are
necessary. Possible restrictions include requirements that the nomina-
tors own a minimum number of shares (either a percentage or a dol-
lar amount, like $100,000, depending on company size); that no pe-
tition could nominate more than one candidate or ten percent of
the directors to be elected; that a stockholder be limited to signing
one petition; that a full description of the candidate be given on a
proper form; that the candidate consent; and that the nominators
pay a fee that would be refundable only if the candidate received
a minimum percentage of the vote.
The justification for shareholder access rests on more than notions
of fairness. If Professor Eisenberg's proposals for change in the role
of management are to work, independent board members must be
26. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 13482 (Apr. 28, 1977), FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
81,130.
27. This was the stated objective of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee when it first considered legislation pertaining to proxy regulation. H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
28. Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Director in
the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (1974).
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elected. Under the prevailing system, however, most directors owe
their selection to the chief executive officer, who dominates the nom-
ination process. And management has little incentive to nominate
candidates of unquestioned ability because its candidates do not
have to face the rigors of a real election. Given the current realities
of the election process, the selection of directors will continue to con-
stitute an annual coronation ritual.
Invigorating stockholder participation in the nomination process is
unlikely to deprive management of its power to perpetuate itself in
office-except in the rare, but important, case when a proxy contest
occurs. Nor does equal access to the proxy machinery assure that the
outside candidate will win. It might operate, however, so as to make
the victorious candidates less beholden to management for their se-
lection. Further, it might have a healthy effect on management's selec-
tion process and encourage the nomination of candidates who can
survive the scrutiny of a contest.
Eisenberg also examines several significant corporate transactions
to see how the law limits the shareholder role in structural situa-
tions. He finds that statutory and common law rules provide for un-
justifiably inconsistent stockholder roles in corporate combinations
that differ in legal form, but not economic substance. Thus he argues
for broader application of the de facto merger doctrine.29
This section is adapted from the earliest of the Eisenberg articles,
30
and despite its updating, significant developments affecting combi-
nations have occurred that are not discussed. These issues are crucial
to analysis of the structural rules governing combinations.
First, the most common form of corporate combination is now the
triangular merger.31 Its effect and purpose are to deny voting and ap-
praisal rights to everybody. Although Eisenberg does not discuss the
triangular merger, his examination of subsidiaries suggests that the
existence of the subsidiary should be ignored.
Second, instead of engaging in a formal merger, corporations often
acquire specific assets and assume specific liabilities. The economic im-
plications of such a transaction are broader than the impact on stock-
holders. When the assets are acquired, the acquiring company's stock
distributed to the acquired company's shareholders, and provision
made for known liabilities, nothing remains to satisfy claims that may
subsequently arise. Products liability claims are the most likely to be
29. See generally Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
30. Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 33.
31. See J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIAT-
ING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 79, 106-08 (1975).
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asserted. Escape from subsequent liabilities is the result that the par-
ties seek when they structure the transaction as a sale of assets. Be-
cause the social consequences of that result may be intolerable, some
recent cases have ignored the form of the transaction and have dealt
with liabilities as if a merger had occurred.
3 2
Third, the courts have encountered the argument that minority
stockholders of a subsidiary are entitled to their share of the syner-
gistic gains resulting from a merger with a parent, and not merely
to the pre-merger value of what they surrendered. 33 This is a funda-
mental issue of fairness affecting the efficacy of the appraisal laws; the
contention has not met with success.
34
Fourth, appraisal statutes have been cut back to apply in fewer
situations as greater reliance has been placed on the market option for
dissatisfied stockholders. At the same time, Delaware has eased the pro-
cedural obstacles in appraisal statutes.3 7 The impact of these develop-
ments needs fresh assessment.
Fifth, courts have wrestled with the problem of whether a merger
requires a valid corporate purpose, or whether a merger justifies it-
self.36 The argument that some mergers are improper is increasingly
made about mergers designed to eliminate minority ownership.37 The
Supreme Court's recent rejection of the applicability of federal law
to such questions increases the importance of state corporation law.38
Finally, Eisenberg considers the impact on the power distribution
model of complex corporate organizations. He notes the recent trend
to create "megasubsidiaries"-massive subsidiaries that own most of
the assets of the parent and whose stock is owned principally or wholly
by the parent. The distribution of voting power to the stockholders
32. Courts, in recent cases, have placed less emphasis on the form of the transaction
and more on the policy served by products liability in determining whether the acquiring
corporation will be liable for the previously unasserted claims against the acquired cor-
poration. E.g., Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1974); Cyr v. B. Offen 9- Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Ray v.
Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous
Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
33. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REv. 297 (1974).
34. E.g., Harriman v. EJ. DuPont de Nemours 8- Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 154 (D. Del.
1975). But see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977).
35. Section 262(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, added in 1976, eased
the cost burdens on a stockholder asserting appraisal rights. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(h)
(Supp. 1976).
36. E.g., Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
37. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 422 SEc. RE. & L. REP. (BNA) E-I (Del. 1977) and
Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 2244 (Del. 1977), where the Delaware
Supreme Court appeared to reach conflicting conclusions on this issue.
38. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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of the subsidiaries accomplishes nothing in restricting the power of
management, since the manager of the parent casts the votes of the
stockholders of the subsidiary.
To deal with the problem requires either a requirement that the
parent's stockholders, instead of its board, decide how the parent votes
its shares, or a pass through of the voting power from the subsidiary's
stockholders to the parent's stockholders. Professor Eisenberg favors
the pass through, at least in some cases-mergers, sale of assets, election
of the subsidiary's board, and some amendments to the certificate of
incorporation-in order to protect the interests of the minority stock-
holders of both the parent and the subsidiary. However, the case law
Professor Eisenberg describes is not favorable to his position, and he
advances a legislative solution to the problem.
As Eisenberg notes, the implementation of his model requires "sig-
nificant statutory revision. ' 39 But by whom? He asserts that "it is still
not too late to hope for action by the states," 40 a hope that many do
not share.41 And even Eisenberg does not dwell long on the prospects
of state law reform. Instead, he points to possibilities of SEC rule-
making, which would be confined to disclosures in, and access to, the
proxy statement-a relatively small part of Eisenberg's normative pack-
age-and federal legislation. Although proposals have been made for
federal minimum standards42 and federal chartering,43 Eisenberg does
not set out to solve the practical political problems that beset the im-
plementation of his model. Strong criticism on this score, however,
is probably unfair. His goal is not to present an alternative that is
now politically feasible, but to set forth the model against which
existing law and law reform should be measured.
The most significant omission in The Structure of the Corporation
is suggested by Bayless Manning's description of corporation law:
[Corporation law is] hollow, empty, and largely devoid of policy
content. It will not become again an area of significance and lose
this hollowness until we reappraise in a very fundamental way
what in the world it is we are trying to accomplish with it. I think
we did more or less know what we were trying to do with cor-
39. P. 820.
40. Id.
41. Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible Management
Conduct, 31 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
43. See, e.g., R. NADER, Mf. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORA-
TION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976); Schwartz,
A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976).
The Yale Law Journal
poration law about 1840. It may not have been a very sensible
thing we sought to do at that time, but we at least had a target
and a philosophy. Since then, as far as I can see, it has all been
downhill. 44
This continuing failure to give corporate law a policy content is se-
rious, for as Professor Conard has observed, "[n]otwithstanding the
pervasive intrusion of external government, corporation boards and
executives still make most of the decisions which affect the welfare
of consumers, employees, and the national economy. ''45
The Eisenberg model apparently proceeds on the premise that the
law should protect stockholder interests by giving them greater power
in some respects, by providing them with more effective watchdogs,
and, of course, by utilizing fiduciary principles. But surely one major
difference between close corporations and large corporations is the
broad public impact of the latter's activities, not only on investors but
also on many others. To contend that corporation law ought to ig-
nore the relationship of the corporate decisionmaking process to so-
ciety and to rely solely on the market or direct government regulation
to protect the public is to continue the insignificance of corporation
law that Manning described.
Professor Eisenberg probably does not intend to present a model
of corporate structure premised on a policy that corporation law
should be concerned only with the private interests of investors. He
acknowledges that his model must take into account the corporation's
relationship to society, but he fails to expand upon the effect that
corporate structure can have on that relationship.
Professor Eisenberg's policy premises are too muted. Clearly he is
in favor of constraining the power of managers, but it is less clear
whose interests he seeks to advance. He may be saying that all in-
terests concerned with corporate behavior will be served if we are
able to make managers less powerful and that this requires a con-
venient mechanism to make them accountable to someone else. The
mechanism he uses is countervailing shareholder power. This would
render shareholders symbolically powerful in order to protect their
own interests and to act as surrogates for others. If this is his thesis,
it needs amplification and analysis. If it is not, and if corporation
law is to escape the opprobrium of Manning's observation, some new
theme must be developed.
44. ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 81 (H. Manne
ed. 1969) (comment by Prof. Manning).
45. A. CONARD, supra note 22, at 318.
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Legal analysis does not carry us far enough. The development of a
policy for corporation law requires the utilization of other disciplines.
History tells us that the corporation has been the vehicle for imple-
menting changing economic and social goals.46 The heart of any state-
ment of policy must be that the legitimacy of the modern corporation
rests both on its utility and its responsibility.47 The question then
remains whether the law can define the corporate structure to foster
agreed social and economic policies.
The work of some social scientists suggests a strong relationship
between the structure of the organization and the goals it seeks. 48 A
special concern expressed by some of the social scientists is that the
existing patterns of corporate behavior frustrate society's goals. Robin
Marris writes that "unless we can develop a type of business organiza-
tion whose stated and legitimate purpose is to create social benefit
for society, while in the process creating a just income for its members
. . . we shall suffer a conflict between national aims and business
ethics."
49
A plan for structure, then, should begin with an understanding of
what the lawmakers want to accomplish. The task is to develop strate-
gies calculated to bring the social impact of the corporation within
the internal control of the corporation. The still developing work
of the social scientists illuminates for us, perhaps even more than the
work of legal analysis, how corporate organizations function and con-
sequently what legal models can achieve5 0 Only with an interdis-
ciplinary approach can we channel the activities of the "soulless"
corporation.
46. See, e.g., 0. HANDLIN& M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSErTS. 1774-1861 (rev. ed. 1969).
47. See J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970).
48. K. ARRow, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL
AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR: AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION FORM ON
ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR (1970). One legal writer who has displayed a firm grasp of the signifi-
cancc of organization is Professor Christopher Stone in his book WHERE THE LAW ENDS:
THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975). A forthcoming work by Professor
John Coffee, Beyond the Shut Eye-Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and a Relevant Legal Response, 64 VA. L. REV. (November 1977) (forth-
coming), makes an important contribution.
49. Marris, Conclusion, in THE CORPORATE SOCIETY 392 (R. Marris ed. 1974).
50. E.g., Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE
L.J. 1091 (1976).
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